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DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1332
Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980)
In Sadat v. Mertes,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit struck down a dual national's' claim that his dual citizenship
conferred jurisdiction upon a federal district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2).3 In so doing, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the
district court' and, ultimately, reaffirmed the strict complete diversity
principle of the case of Strawbridge v. Curtis.' This non-expansive interpreta-
tion of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by the Seventh Circuit may indicate the need for
congressional action to protect individuals such as the Sadat appellant.
The present action arose in the federal district court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin.' Sadat, the complainant, sought one million dollars in
damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident7 involving himself
and the appellees, Mertes and Galganites.' The nine appellees were alleged to
be either citizens of Wisconsin or Connecticut. The accident occurred in
Wisconsin while Sadat was on his way to O'Hare International Airport in
Chicago, Illinois.'
Sadat asserted the jurisdiction of the federal district court upon the basis
of "diversity of citizenship"' 0 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) or 28 U.S.C.
1. 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980).
2. A dual national is one who is a citizen of two or more states possessing the
privileges, rights and duties as defined by the Constitution of that nation-state. See
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 344 (1939).
3. 615 F.2d at 1178.
4. Sadat v. Mertes, 464 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wisc. 1979).
5. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (1806).
6. Sadat v. Mertes, 464 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D. Wisc. 1979).
7. See 615 F.2d at 1178.
8. Id.
9. 615 F.2d at 1179.
10. Diversity of citizenship is a phrase used with reference to the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, which under U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, extends to cases between
citizens of different states, designating the condition existing when the party on one
side of a lawsuit is a citizen of one state, and the party on the other side is a citizen of
another state, or between a citizen of a state and an alien. The requisite jurisdictional
amount must, in addition, be met. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(1).
(126)
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§ 1332(a)(2)." In the context of the instant case, section 1332 creates federal
diversity jurisdiction over actions between "citizens of different states," and
between "citizens of a state and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof."" Sadat asserted the jurisdiction of the court by claiming that when
the action was commenced, he was a naturalized" American and a
domiciliary of the United States. The appellant argued that on June 7, 1976
his domicile was in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, ' and thus he was a citizen of a
state within the meaning of section 1332(a)(1).
Alternatively, Sadat argued that he resided in Egypt at the commence-
ment of the action on June 7, 1976." The appellant asserted the jurisdiction
of the court by claiming he was a citizen of Egypt; as.such, he posited that
district court jurisdiction existed pursuant to section 1332(a)(2).
Thus, the issues facing the court were: (1) whether a person possessing
dual nationality, one of which is United States citizenship, is "a citizen or
subject of a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2);"1 and, (2) whether this
suit is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts."
The federal district court held that: (1) at the commencement of the
action the plaintiff was domiciled in Cairo, Egypt; although he was a
naturalized citizen of the United States, he was not "a citizen of a state" as
required under subsection 1332(a)(1), thus, he was not able to invoke the
provision of that subsection; and, (2) a naturalized U.S. citizen may not assert
his foreign citizenship based upon birth to meet the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), governing diversity jurisdiction between "citizens of a
state" and aliens."8
Thus, the federal district court dismissed the suit filed by Sadat for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction."
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) Diversity of Citizenship; amount in controversy; costs:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different states;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
and
(3) citizens of different states and in which foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof are additional parties ....
12. Id.
13. A naturalized citizen is one who, being an alien by birth, has received
citizenship under naturalization laws. BLAck's LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
14. 615 F.2d at 1179, 1180.
15. Id. at 1178.
16. Id. at 1180, 1182.
17. Id. at 1188.
18. Id. at 1189. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
19. 464 F. Supp. at 1312.
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In examining the issues presented to the district court, the Court of
Appeals first addressed the issue of whether or not the appellant was a
citizen of any of the United States.' The court held that the plaintiff was not
a citizen 6f any state of the United States at the time of the commencement of
the action because he resided in Egypt; therefore, diversity jurisdiction did
not exist under section 1332(a)(2).2' The determining factor was the
appellant's status at the time of the commencement of the action, "because
that is the time at which the jurisdiction of the court is determined."
Even though the appellant argued that he intended to return to
Pennsylvania, and that he never intended to make Cairo his home, the court
stated that, "his statement of intent is entitled to little weight when in
conflict Witlh the facts." Sadat failed to establish Pernnsylvinia was hig
domicile.n The appellant left Pennsylvania in 1973 for Lebanon and he never
established, "the physical presence necessary to reestablish his domicile in
Pennsylvania."' The court ruled that, "a domicile once established continues
until it is superseded by a new domicile."
The second issue addressed by the Court of Appeals was whether the
plaintiff was a citizen or subject of a foreign state." Section 1332(a)(2) vests
the federal district court with jurisdiction over suits between citizens of a
state and citizens of foreign states; such jurisdiction is referred to as alienage
jurisdiction.' The court emphasized the dominant policy consideration for the
statute's jurisdictional provisions by relying on Blair v. Rubenstein,' which
held that section 1332(a)(2) "was intended to provide the federal courts with
a form of protective jurisdiction over matters implicating international
relations where the national interest was paramount.' The criterion applied
by the court to determine whether the appellant was a foreign citizen within
the meaning of section 1332(a)(2) was: "whether the country in which
citizenship is claimed would so recognize him."' This criterion was also
enunciated by the court in Blair," which held that "it is the undoubted right
20. 615 F.2d at 1181.
21. Id. at 1182.
22. Id. at 1180.
23. Id. at 1181.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1182.
27. Alienage jurisdiction - 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
28. 133 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
29. 615 F.2d at 1182.
30. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of National-
ity Laws, 12 April 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 5 Hudson Int'l. Legislation 359.
31. 133 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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of each country to determine who are its nationals and it seems to be general
international usage that such a determination will usually be accepted by
other nations. 2
The Court of Appeals maintained that, notwithstanding Sadat's U.S.
naturalization, Egypt still regarded the appellant as an Egyptian citizenY To
prove his Egyptian citizenship, Sadat produced a letter from the Egyptian
Consulate General,' granting him permission to be naturalized with United
States citizenship while maintaining his Egyptian citizenship. He was also
issued an Egyptian driver's license and international driver's license by the
Egyptian government.' Based upon the evidence presented, the court
concluded that despite Sadat's naturalization in the United States, he was an
Egyptian citizen and was so recognized by Egypt under 'their laws.-'
Therefore, he possessed dual citizenship and was a dual national."
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals held that the appellant could not
rely on his status as a dual national to be considered a subject of a foreign
state within the meaning of section 1332(a)(2).1 The court examined two
district court decisions to reach its conclusion. 9 In Aquirre v. Nagel," the
plaintiff, an American citizen of Mexican parentage who was regarded by
Mexico as a Mexican citizen,"' brought a personal injury suit in federal
district court pursuant to section 1332(a)(1).' In Aquirre, both the plaintiffs
and defendants were alleged to be citizens of Michigan.'3 The district court
ruled that the plaintiff's jurisdictional claim could not be based on section
1332(a)(1) because the action was not between citizens of different states.
However, the district court did have jurisdiction under section 1332(a)(2).
The parents of the plaintiff were citizens of Mexico and Mexico regarded her
as a citizen by virtue of her parentage." In Sadat, the Court of Appeals
rejected the holding in Aquirre because of its expansive nature and because
32. Id. at 499.
33. 615 F.2d at 1183.
34. This is to certify that the Egyptian government does not have any objections
for its citizens to officially apply for American citizenship provided that they have no
standing criminal records, no financial liabilities to the government, have served in the
military service and seek the permission of the Egyptian Government beforehand.
35. 615 F.2d at 1184.
36. Id. at 1183.
37. Id.
38. See 615 F.2d at 1187.
39. Id. at 1185.
40. 270 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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of the Aquirre court's failure to examine the literal language of the statute
without regard for the underlying policies of alienage jurisdiction.,5
The Court of Appeals also examined and ultimately relied upon the
authority established in Raphael v. Hertzberg. 6 The Raphael court disallowed
access to the federal courts under alienage jurisdiction." In Raphael, the
plaintiff, a naturalized U.S. citizen, averred that he was also a citizen of the
United Kingdom." The action was brought against defendant residents of
California for breach of contract, a variety of torts, including negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty.'9
In Sadat, the court's justification for its holding commenced with the
statutory requirement of completed diversity. The Court of Appeals stated
that to allow naturalized citizens access to the federal district courts, "would
give naturalized citizens nearly unlimited access to the federal district
courts, access which has been denied to native-born citizens."50 The court
further stated that "such favored treatment is unsupported by the policies
underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1332."' l The court then refrained from extending the
scope of section 1332.
Essentially, the Seventh Circuit's stance is a return to the complete
diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtis.2 The rule was established when the
Supreme Court of the United States, in 1806, held that where the interest is
joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue
or liable to be sued in federal courts.0 In Strawbridge, the complainants
appealed from the dismissal of a bill in chancery by a Massachusetts circuit
court for want of jurisdiction. ' Some of the complainants were averred to be
citizens of Massachusetts. The defendants were similarly alleged to be
citizens of that same state. Only one citizen, Curtis, was a citizen of another
state, Vermont. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court
looked to the language of the District Court's Jurisdiction Act, to find that
diversity exists only "where an alien is a party, or the suit is between a
citizen of [the] state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another
state."
45. 615 F.2d at 1186.
46. 470 F. Supp. 984. (C.D. Cal. 1979).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 615 F.2d at 1186.
51. Id.
52. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L. Ed. 435 (1806).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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The holding of the Court of Appeals appears to have been based on the
intentions of the legislators who framed section 1332.1 The situation
presented in Sadat was one of first impression at the circuit level.
The Court of Appeals applied the holding of Raphael to the facts of
Sadat. 7 However, the Raphael case did not present the same or a similar
factual situation. Moreover, the court returned to the complete diversity rule
of Strawbridge v. Curtis to prevent the appellant from gaining access to the
federal district court. The Strawbridge rule as applied by the Seventh Circuit
might give a native born- plaintiff, who is a citizen of a state, the ability to
manipulate his suit by preventing a defendant, who is a naturalized U.S.
citizen of a state, possessing dual citizenship, from any access to the federal
district courts - providing that the plaintiff can find another citizen of his
own state who would be a proper co-defendant. 9 Such an anomalous situation
defeats the requirement of complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the
jurisdictional claim of the defendant. The plaintiff would then be able to
proceed to state court, regardless of any possible bias to the defendant or any
possible foreign relations repercussions. This type of "favored treatment" has
not been supported by the policies of the legislation. ® The situation presented
in Sadat fell squarely within either 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) or § 1332(a)(2). The
court in Aquirrel held that it was not "good law to deny the existence of
jurisdiction under subsection (2) on the grounds of non-existence of jurisdic-
tion under subsection (1)." One of the two diversity provisions should be
applicable to Sadat.
The Court of Appeals decision has left the future of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
strictly within the province of Congress. For the time being, the Sadat
holding leaves intact the general principle of complete diversity of Straw-
bridge and the strict interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court declined to
extend the scope of section 1332, concluding: "The statutory terms 'citizens of
different states' and 'citizens or subjects of a foreign state' are presumably
amenable to some congressional expansion consistent with constitutional
limitations." Sadat v. Mertes indicates that the courts are waiting for
56. 615 F.2d at 1182.
57. Id. at 1188.
58. Native born is a natural born subject or citizen; a citizen who owes his domi-
cile or citizenship to the fact of his birth within the country referred to.
59. See Note, Abolishing Diversity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 966-68 (1979).
60. 615 F.2d at 1186.
61. 270 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
62. Id. at 536.
63. 615 F.2d at 1189.
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Congress to act. As long as Congress remains silent, the courts will refuse to
grapple with the intracacies of federal diversity jurisdiction based upon dual
citizenship within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and will instead
continue to apply the inflexible and strict Strawbridge rule of complete
diversity.
Patricia Lynn Gatling
